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Beyond Airspace Safety: A Feminist Perspective on
Drone Privacy Regulation
Kristen M.J. Thomasen*

INTRODUCTION
No technology emerges in a social or legal vacuum.1 The laws and norms
guiding acceptable uses of new technologies help to shape the ways in which
these technologies benefit or disadvantage different individuals and
communities.2 Recently, the impact of drones on women’s privacy has
garnered sensational attention in media and popular discussion. Media
headlines splash stories from drones spying on sunbathing or naked women
and girls, to drones being used to stalk women through public spaces, to drones
delivering abortion pills to women who might otherwise lack access. 3 Yet despite
this popular attention, and the immense literature that has emerged analyzing the
*
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Assistant Professor of Law, Robotics & Society at the University of Windsor, Faculty of
Law and PhD Candidate in Law at the University of Ottawa, Canada. My sincerest
thanks go to John Popham, Sinziana Gutiu, Madeleine Elish and the participants at the
We Robot 2017 conference, and to the participants at the Feminist Legal Studies Queen’s
(FLSQ) Speaker Series, particularly Bita Amani and Kathleen Lahey, for their insightful
and helpful comments on earlier versions of this article. I am also grateful to Joanna
Pawlowski and Cherlene Cheung for their fantastic and lightning speed research
assistance, and to my anonymous reviewer for providing excellent recommendations for
the improvement of this article.
See generally Corinne Mason & Shoshana Magnet, ‘‘Surveillance Studies and Violence
Against Women” (2012) 10 Surveillance & Society 105 at 108 (‘‘The twin fields of
feminist science studies and the history of science clearly demonstrate that new
technologies are not objective nor do they spring forth in a cultural vacuum”); Ronald
Leenes & Federica Lucivero, ‘‘Laws on Robots, Laws by Robots, Laws in Robots:
Regulating Robot Behaviour by Design” (2014) 6 Law, Innovation and Technology 193
at 194.
See, e.g., Mason & Magnet, supra, note 1 at 109: ‘‘the history of surveillance technologies
reveals that they also were developed in a cultural code rife with inequalities, and thus
reflect those same inequities” and ‘‘as these computing technologies were developed in a
cultural context of the persistent and widespread occurrence of violence against women,
it is expected that these new technologies reflect these old inequalities and have resulted in
the intensification of the surveillance and stalking of victims of violence.”
The latter fitting more directly into the U.S. concept of ‘‘decisional privacy” (see e.g. Roe
v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113). For example, activists have demonstrated how drones can be
used to deliver abortion pills in both Poland and Northern Ireland, where abortion is
illegal, highlighting the potential of this technology for subversive uses in the future. See,
e.g., Lauren O’Neil, ‘‘‘Abortion drone’ delivers pregnancy-terminating pills to women in
Poland,” CBC News (29 June 2015), online: <www.cbc.ca/news/trending/abortiondrone-delivers-medication-to-women-in-poland-1.3132284>.
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privacy implications of drone technology,4 the ways in which the drone might
enhance or undermine women’s privacy in particular have not yet been the
subject of significant academic analysis.
This article seeks to contribute to the growing drone privacy literature by
examining some of the ways in which the technology is apt to impact women’s
privacy.5 While the analytical focus is on the gendered privacy impacts of drone
technology, the article and its conclusions are about more than women’s privacy.
Examining some of the differential impacts of the technology, and the laws that
guide its use, helps to reveal broader inequities that can go unseen when we think
about technology without social context. The article ultimately argues that drone
regulators cannot continue to treat the technology as though it is value-neutral
— impacting all individuals in the same ways. Going forward, the social context
in which drone technology is emerging must inform both drone-specific
regulation, and the ways in which we approach privacy generally. This article
is framed as a starting point for further discussion about how this can be done
within the Canadian context and elsewhere.
First, a brief note on terminology. ‘‘Drone” is a colloquial term now
commonly used to refer to remotely piloted aerial vehicles that range in scale and
function from military weapons to children’s toys. This article is not focued on
the use of the technology in military or international operations. 6 Instead, this
4

5

6

See, e.g., A Michael Froomkin & Zak Colangelo, ‘‘Self-Defense Against Robots and
Drones,” 48 Conn L Rev 1 [forthcoming]; Ryan Calo, ‘‘The Drone as Privacy Catalyst”
64 Stan L Rev Online 29; Margot E Kaminski, ‘‘Drone Federalism: Civilian Drones and
the Things they Carry” (2013) 4 Cal L Rev 57; John Villasenor, ‘‘Observations from
Above: Unmanned Aircraft Systems and Privacy” (2013) 36 Harv J L & Pub Pol’y 457;
Gregory S McNeal, ‘‘Drones and Aerial Surveillance: Considerations for Legislators” in
The Robots Are Coming: The Project on Civilian Robotics (Pepperdine University Legal
Studies Research Paper No. 2015/3. (2014); Troy Rule, ‘‘Airspace in an Age of Drones”
(2015) 95 BULaw Rev 155; Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada Research
Group, ‘‘Drones in Canada: Will the Proliferation of Domestic Drone Use in Canada
Raise New Concerns for Privacy’’ (2013), online: <www.priv.gc.ca/ information/
research-recherche/2013/ drones_201303_e.asp>; Scott Thompson & Ciara BrackenRoche, ‘‘Understanding Public Opinion of UAVs in Canada: A 2014 Analysis of Survey
Data and its Policy Implications” (2015) 3 Journal of Unmanned Vehicle Systems 1;
Queen’s University Surveillance Studies Centre, ‘‘Surveillance Drones: Privacy Implications of the Spread of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) in Canada,’’ Report to the
Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada by Ciara Bracken-Roche et al (2014); DM
Holden, ‘‘Flying Robots and Privacy in Canada” (2016) 14 CJLT; Ashley Taborda,
‘‘Privacy & Drone Surveillance: The Illusive Remedy” (2017) 15 CJLT 379; Ontario,
Office of the Information and Privacy Commissioner, Privacy and Drones: Unmanned
Aerial Vehicles (Toronto: Information and Privacy Commissioner, 2012).
The impact of drones on privacy will be different amongst and between women. This
article does not imagine one experience of drone privacy invasion, rather it looks at the
ways in which gender – as one social factor among many – has influenced the
development of privacy law and the potential impact of drone technology.
For more on the politics of the military drones see, e.g., Anna Feignbaum, ‘‘From
Cyborg Feminism to Drone Feminism: Remembering Women’s Anti-Nuclear Acti-

BEYOND AIRSPACE SAFETY

309

article is concerned with the devices that are commercially available to
individuals, companies, and domestic law enforcement (i.e. non-military
devices). These drones are typically small in size, often weighing up to several
kilograms. They may be equipped with a variety of additional sensors like highresolution cameras that are either already installed at the point of sale, or added
to the device by the operator. Drones of this size and function can also be
manufactured at home. This article considers the current, proposed, or
anticipated uses of the technology by private individuals, commercial entities,
and/or domestic law enforcement.
With this technological focus in mind, this article will first explain why these
domestic-use drones in particular raise gendered privacy concerns, and why a
gendered analysis is relevant to thinking about the regulation of the privacy
implications of the technology. The article goes on to examine how women have
long faced differential access to privacy in public spaces compared to men. 7 This
has arisen both from a gendered history of the legal understanding of what
privacy is, and from the subsequent inadequate legal and normative protections
against the kinds of intrusions that primarily affect women. Specifically, the
second section of the article considers how gendered notions of modesty have
undermined women’s privacy in public space — a space where women already
face gender-specific intrusions upon their privacy, which may be further
exacerbated by drone technology.
The article goes on to argue that the current approach of Canadian and U.S.
regulatory agencies — which focus primarily on physical safety concerns
associated with drone use, largely to the exclusion of a nuanced approach to
privacy issues — inappropriately treats the technology as though it is valueneutral. The current regulatory approach does exactly what feminist technology
critics would caution against: it focuses on the artefact (the physical drone), while
overlooking the broader cultural and social practices associated with drone
technology, and the social context into which drones are introduced.8 This
narrow focus obfuscates the ways in which drone technology can reproduce,
enhance, alter, or ameliorate existing social inequalities through, among other
things, its impacts on privacy.9 The article concludes by arguing that drone
technology in particular (though not exclusively) requires a more nuanced

7

8

visms” (2015) 16 Feminist Theory 26; Lorraine Bayard de Volo, ‘‘Unmanned? Gender
Recalibration and the Rise of Drone Warfare” (2016) 12 Politics & Gender 50; Tyler
Wall & Torin Monahan, ‘‘Surveillance and Violence from Afar: The Politics of Drones
and Liminal Security-Scapes” (2011) 15 Theoretical Criminology 239; Derek Gregory,
‘‘From a View to a Kill: Drones and Late Modern War” (2011) 28 Theory, Culture and
Society 188.
Speaking broadly of women’s experiences here. The jurisprudence discussed below has
often focused on the experience of wealthy, white, cis, heterosexual women, which is
obviously not a universal experience.
See, e.g., Judy Wajcman, ‘‘Feminist Theories of Technology” (2010) 34 Cambridge
Journal of Economics 143 cautioning against exactly such an approach.

310 CANADIAN JOURNAL OF LAW AND TECHNOLOGY

[16 C.J.L.T.]

approach to regulation that takes into consideration social context and the
differential impacts of the technology on individuals and groups. Such
perspective is relevant to the current and ongoing debate about drone
regulation,10 particularly in light of the sometimes granular ways in which the
gendered impact of drones has already come under scrutiny in popular
discussion.11 A gendered perspective provides a critical lens through which to
identify some of the difficult privacy challenges raised by drones — not only for
women — at a time when the laws guiding the permissible uses and designs of the
technology continue to influence the trajectory of innovation.

SECTION I: THE ‘‘SUNBATHING TEENAGER” AND DRONE
PRIVACY REGULATION
News stories about drones spying on ‘‘naked,” ‘‘topless,” or ‘‘sunbathing”
women and girls make regular headlines,12 as do stories about drones peering
into women’s homes, apartments, backyards, or hovering over swimming
pools.13 Anecdotally, it can be difficult to avoid these stories when following
popular discussions about drones. These themes also appear in some of the
academic writing on drone privacy.14 On the other hand, similar stories about
9

10

11
12

13

See, e.g., Linda L Layne, Shalla L Vostral & Nate Boyer, eds, Feminist Technology
(Champaign, Illinois: UI Press, 2010).
Transport Canada is currently reviewing new regulations for drones in Canada,
including seeking community input on a set of proposed new rules. These rules do not
deal with privacy or other social implications of the technology, as discussed in the
section below. See: Transport Canada, ‘‘Proposed Rules for Drones in Canada,” online:
<www.tc.gc.ca/eng/civilaviation/opssvs/proposed-rules-drones-canada.html>.
See, e.g., infra at notes 11-13.
See, e.g., Emma Colton, ‘‘Pervy Nerds Get Their Hands on a Drone and Use it Just How
You’d Expect,” The Daily Caller (24 June 2014), online: <dailycaller.com/2014/06/24/
pervy-nerds-get-their-hands-on-a-drone-and-use-it-just-how-youd-expect/>; Kirstie
McCrum, ‘‘Peeping Toms are ‘Using Drones to Spy on Women and Sharing the
Footage online,’” The Mirror (28 March 2011), online: <www.mirror.co.uk/news/uknews/peeping-toms-using-drones-spy-7642394>; ‘‘Drone caught spying on Vancouver
woman sunbathing topless,” Global News (14 August 2015), online: <globalnews.ca/
video/2167054/drone-caught-spying-on-vancouver-woman-sunbathing-topless>.
Many online reports of these stories also, disconcertingly, choose to post the video; I
have not cited to these. The posting of this voyeuristic footage to the Internet raises
broader concerns and challenges for women’s privacy, and connects drone privacy
challenges to discussions about, for instance, revenge porn. See, e.g., Danielle Keats
Citron & Mary Anne Franks, ‘‘Criminalizing Revenge Porn” (2014) 49 Wake Forest L
Rev 345. Notably in Canada a number of provinces have introduced or considered
statutory tort recourse for incidents of revenge porn.
See, e.g., ‘‘Drone Spy: Man uses UAV to Take Video of Seattle Woman,” Daily Motion
(2015), online: <www.dailymotion.com/video/x2q8a65>; ‘‘Watch This Badass Woman Try to Shoot Down A Drone Filming Her House,” Popular Mechanics (5 March
2017), online: <www.popularmechanics.com/ flight/drones/a25543/ shoot-downdrone/>.
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drones spying on men — particularly in a state of undress — are relatively rare. 15
In a 2016 post on the online news website Slate, law professor Margot
Kaminski labeled this recurrent theme the ‘‘sunbathing teenager narrative” —
alluding to the fact that these stories often involve drones flying over women,
particularly young women, in a state of undress. Kaminski questions, ‘‘with all
we know about the complexities of information privacy,” which is deeply
engaged by drone technology, ‘‘why is the female sunbather the story that keeps
capturing attention?” 16 To try to explain why this narrative might be so popular,
Kaminski refers to the old tale of Lady Godiva, whose husband, Count Leofric,
claimed he would lower oppressive taxes on the residents of Coventry, England
the ‘‘day she rode naked through the streets on horseback.” As the tale goes, she
did exactly that. Out of respect for their heroine’s modesty, all of the city folk
averted their eyes, except for one man, the Peeping Tom — who was promptly
punished for the offence of undermining the noble woman’s honour. Kaminski
goes on to explain the contemporary drone connection with the Lady Godiva
tale:
The sunbather disrupted by drones is a Lady Godiva story, of sorts,
without the tax policy. A young woman expresses liberation by wearing
a bikini in her backyard or on the beach. Everyone generally follows
social norms and refrains from staring for too long, or taking photos or
video. But the hovering drone breaks that agreement and must be
punished, just like Tom. Often it’s dad who does the punishing, but
sometimes it’s just a Good Samaritan. Law isn’t very helpful.

Ultimately, Kaminski argues that this gendered trope is a distraction; ‘‘it
provides a woefully incomplete account of the kinds of privacy concerns that
drones raise,” ignoring, for instance, the significant impact that drones might
have on informational privacy, the implications of facial recognition payloads
for anonymity, risks relating to cybersecurity and hacking, and so on. She
expresses concern about the possibility that legislators will focus on protecting
the modesty of sunbathing teenagers, while ignoring the potentially far more

14

15

16

Margot Kaminski identified examples in her Slate post discussed in this section. See, e.g.,
McNeal, supra note 4; Troy Rule, ‘‘Drone Zoning” (2016) 95 NCL Rev 133. Both cited
for this point in Margot Kaminski, ‘‘Enough with the ‘Sunbathing Teenager’ Gambit,”
Slate Future Tense (17 May 2016), online: <www.slate.com/articles/technology/
future_tense/2016/05/drone_privacy_is_about_much_more_than_sunbathing_teenage_daughters.html>.
A Google search for ‘‘drone spies on man” (from Canada at the time of writing) reveals
one story from Utah about a couple who spied on a series of people including one man in
his bathroom, and number of stories about husbands spying on their cheating wives.
Meanwhile, the same search with ‘‘woman” reveals multiple pages of applicable search
results: Mary Papenfuss, ‘‘Utah Couple Arrested Over ‘Peeping Tom’ Drone”
Huffington Post (17 February 2017), online: <www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/peeping-tom-drone_us_58a6847fe4b045cd34c03e56>.
Kaminski, supra note 14.
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widespread and problematic impacts that drones can have on informational
privacy.
I agree with Kaminski that policymakers need to consider the broader range
of privacy issues raised by the recent proliferation of drones. However, I also
believe that this ‘‘sunbathing teenager” trope, which Kaminski has helpfully
identified and named, reveals important privacy concerns arising from the
growing domestic popularity of drone technology. While Kaminski is right that
lawmakers would be foolish (and sexist) to focus drone regulations around outdated norms of women’s modesty, this gendered privacy narrative nevertheless
reveals a deeper issue that lawmakers should be concerned about. Drones are
particularly adept at taking advantage of weaknesses in privacy protection that
exist in large part because the early origins of the privacy doctrine did focus on
women’s modesty as central to women’s privacy, and privacy generally. To
ignore this broader issue risks overlooking some of the ways in which drone
technology is likely to exacerbate privacy intrusions experienced by women. The
following sub-sections explain how the modesty theory understands and protects
only a limited notion of privacy, and how this antiquated notion of privacy
influenced the early development of privacy jurisprudence. The next section
builds on this background to examine how early reliance on modesty has affected
how the law protects privacy today, and what this means for women’s privacy in
the context of growing drone use.

The Modesty Theory of Privacy
Lady Godiva’s ride through city streets aside,17 the modesty theory of
privacy that underlies the ‘‘sunbather” narrative is grounded upon a traditional
expectation of a woman’s confinement and seclusion within the home. 18 When
she is relegated to the home, she ought not be interfered with or gazed upon by
others — particularly uninvited men — including where that gaze is mediated by
a drone.
A central problem with this understanding of a woman’s privacy is that it is
narrowly limited to protecting her from intrusions in circumstances where she is
concealed, secluded, and behaving virtuously; fulfilling her domestic roles of
homemaking and child care.19 Accordingly, in order to gain protection, a woman
historically had to essentially become invisible — modesty norms required that
women ‘‘exhibit speech, dress, and behaviour calculated to deflect attention from
17

18

19

Let us not forget that Lady Godiva was a British noblewoman with considerable class
and race privilege to protect her.
Historically, ‘‘women’s privacy” brought to mind the notion of peaceful seclusion within
the domestic sphere. See Anita Allen, Uneasy Access: Privacy for Women in a Free
Society (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield, 1988) at 20: Feminine modesty
forced a kind of ‘‘obligatory, social disappearing act that shield[ed] a woman in the
mantle of privacy”.
Anita Allen & Erin Mack, ‘‘How Privacy Got its Gender” (1991) 10 N Ill UL Rev 441 at
453.
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their bodies, views, or desires.”20 Protection of this state of being does little to
actually protect a woman’s experience of privacy (e.g. her access to an invasionfree home life did not fall within the modesty framework due to her traditional
role as subservient housekeeper and mother).21 Nor would this theory protect a
woman perceived by traditional norms to be immodest — one who ventures into
public, engages in sexual activity outside of marriage, or enters the workforce. 22
The modesty theory of privacy bestowed a heavily class-, race-, and sexualitylimited protection against visibility and interference by others, reliant upon on a
woman’s self-enforced concealment and seclusion in the marital or family home,
and her ability to meet antiquated standards of virtue.23
The ‘‘sunbather” narrative has undertones of this modesty theory of privacy;
as pointed out by Kaminski, the drone that flies over a woman in her backyard
or in her home, invading her privacy and undermining her modesty (and, most
importantly, undermining the man of the house’s control over who can see her),
is deserving of punishment — often by the young woman’s father.24 As will be
further discussed below, however, the same has not been the case where a drone
is used in a similarly invasive way in a public space, again echoing this
understanding of privacy as based on concealment, seclusion and invisibility.
While a modesty-based analysis of a woman’s right to privacy seems antiquated
now, the next sub-section examines how this notion shaped the early
development of privacy jurisprudence, which still resonates today.

Modesty Within Privacy Jurisprudence
Professor Anita Allen has highlighted the role that traditional norms of
female modesty and virtue played in the early development of the American
privacy tort (which provides the foundation for the development of the Canadian
common law tort of ‘‘intrusion upon seclusion”).25 These norms of modesty laid
the ground work for how courts have come to understand the scope and limits of
privacy protection. For instance, in the article ‘‘How Privacy Got its Gender,”
Allen and co-author Erin Mack identify the ‘‘outmoded normative assumptions
about female modesty and seclusion” at the core of the tort’s early development
through an examination of early privacy tort cases, as well as the foundational
article ‘‘The Right to Privacy” by Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis. 26
20
21
22

23
24
25

Ibid at 444.
Ibid at 477.
Ibid at 477. This problem is notably still prevalent in sexual assault trials in Canada and
the U.S. See, e.g., Alison Crawford, ‘‘Justice Robin Camp resigns after judicial council
recommends removal,” CBC News (9 March 2017), online: <www.cbc.ca/news/politics/
justice-robin-camp-judicial-council-1.4017233>.
Allen & Mack, supra note 19 at 444.
Kaminski, supra note 14.
See, e.g., Jones v. Tsige, 2012 ONCA 32, 2012 CarswellOnt 274, 108 O.R. (3d) 241, 211
A.C.W.S. (3d) 1007 (Ont. C.A.).
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For instance, in laying the groundwork for the protection of a man’s right to
a ‘‘private home” and ‘‘family life” (i.e. the famous ‘‘right to be let alone”),
Warren and Brandeis rely on a line of cases in which parents and husbands are
found to have rights of recovery against the male seducers of their daughters and
wives27 or where the shame and dishonour caused by a daughter’s seduction is
judicially remedied.28 Intrusions upon a woman’s modesty were framed as an
offence to her husband or father deserving of compensation (rather than as an
offence, for example, to her control over her own body or environment, solitude,
or anonymity). These are among the early cases that set out the scope and
boundaries of the ‘‘right to be let alone” in Warren and Brandeis’ famous article
— which ultimately underscored the development of the American privacy tort.
Allen and Mack observe that ‘‘women appear in Warren and Brandeis’ article as
seduced wives and daughters,” while the implications of a ‘‘private home” and
‘‘family life” for women, and, in particular, women’s privacy, go completely
overlooked.29
Allen and Mack also refer to numerous tort cases where the courts went
remarkably far to compensate a female plaintiff for a privacy loss on the
reasoning that any intrusion which amounted to a loss of her modesty should be
actionable.30 Allen and Mack determine from the reasoning in these cases that
the basis on which male judges rationalized such sizeable remedies was a
‘‘paternalistic, patriarchal concern for feminine modesty and virtuous seclusion”;
not a concern for a woman’s equal ‘‘right to be let alone” or her right to benefit
from the values that privacy protection can afford.31 Were that to be the case,

26

27

28
29

30

31

Samuel D Warren & Louis D Brandeis, ‘‘The Right to Privacy” (1890) 4 Harv L Rev 193;
Allen & Mack, supra note 19 at 477.
As a reflection of the principle of non-interference with a man’s family relations: Allen &
Mack, supra note 19 at 458.
As proof of a historical regard for human emotion in law: Ibid at 458.
Ibid at 459, 466: Warren and Brandeis were ‘‘not critical of the ways in which homelife [. .
.] and norms of female modesty contributed to women’s lacking autonomous
decisionmaking and meaningful forms of individual privacy.” To underscore this point,
Allen and Mack direct us to Charlotte Perkins Gilman, a contemporary of Warren and
Brandeis, who emphasized that the appeal to the ‘‘privacy of the home” overlooked (or
took for granted) that someone needed to maintain that home, and that women had been
relegated to that role; that there was not actually much privacy in the home for women,
between children, other family members, servants, etc; and that because of male
authority over the home domain women confined to that home lacked decisional privacy
over marriage, sex, and reproduction. ‘‘Women’s lack of meaningful opportunities for
individual privacy is tied to their economic role. To have real privacy, women would have
to be freed from their limited role in the economy as mere housekeepers and mothers”:
Allen & Mack, supra note 19 at 458 (summarizing Gilman).
‘‘Typical judges were likely to be strongly influenced by pervasive notions of a need to
take special care to preserve women’s modesty as among their chief virtues.” Allen &
Mack, supra note 19 at 462.
Ibid at 464.
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then the many intrusions upon a woman within the marital or family home
would also be prohibited.
Women’s modesty, and her concealment from the gaze of strangers within
the home, has also factored into the development of constitutional privacy
protections. For instance, Professor Jeannie Suk examines the central role of
women’s modesty in modern U.S. Fourth Amendment precedents.32 In Kyllo v
United States, which involved the use of a forward-looking Infrared device by
police to examine the amount of heat emanating from a home, Justice Scalia
centres his concerns about the invasiveness of this technique on the potential
visibility of the ‘‘lady of the house taking her bath and sauna.” 33 Suk elaborates
that this focus on the lady in her sauna (who appears nowhere in the facts of the
case), ‘‘evokes the privacy interest of the man [of the house] entitled to see the
lady of the house naked and his interest in shielding her body from prying eyes.
Privacy is figured as a woman, an object of the male gaze.”34
Suk explains how the ‘‘lady in the bath” evokes concerns about prying eyes
lusting after a man’s wife; the threat to the woman’s virtue by the suggestion of
sexual infidelity in the eyes of the voyeur.35 Anxiety about an intrusion into the
man’s home ‘‘can be expressed as anxiety about female sexual virtue. A meaning
of a man’s home as his castle that emerges here is the need to shield his wife’s
body from other men’s desire.”36
While such explicitly gendered rhetoric has not appeared in Canadian
constitutional privacy cases, the judicial protection of privacy on the basis of
concealment within the sanctity and privacy of the home — sometimes developed
through reference to American case law including that cited above — certainly
does exist here, too.37 And, a recent Ontario Court of Appeal decision also
32
33
34

35

36

37

Jeannie Suk, ‘‘Is Privacy a Woman?” (2009) 97 Geo LJ 485.
Kyllo v. United States, 533 US 27 (2001).
Suk, supra note 32 at 488 highlights other examples from the United States Supreme
Court.
‘‘Kyllo’s lady in the bath draws on a complex of cultural associations that emanate from
this canonical story: the prying eyes of legal elders who violate the private boundary of a
home and lust after a man’s wife; the predication of well-ordered domesticity on the
woman’s virtue, gravely threatened by the suggestion of sexual infidelity, even rape,
enacted in the voyeurs’ observation of her naked body; the restoration of domestic order
qua legal order by punishment of the gaze.” Ibid at 490.
‘‘If in the adage [a man’s home is his castle] the home is envisioned as a barrier against
intrusion, we have seen that anxiety about intrusion can be expressed as anxiety about
female sexual virtue. A meaning of a man’s home as his castle that emerges here is the
need to shield his wife’s body from other men’s desire. To neglect or decline to do so is to
prove himself unworthy to be the man of the castle, unworthy of that domain of privacy
to which a man in his home is entitled.” Ibid at 491. See also I Bennett Capers, ‘‘Unsexing
the Fourth Amendment” (2014—2015) 48 UC Davis L Rev 855.
See, e.g., R. v. Plant, 1993 CarswellAlta 566, 1993 CarswellAlta 94, [1993] 3 S.C.R. 281,
[1993] S.C.J. No. 97 [1993] A.W.L.D. 890 (S.C.C.); R. v. Tessling, 2004 SCC 67, 2004
Carswell Ont 4351, 2004 CarswellOnt 4352, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 432, [2004] S.C.J. No. 63
(S.C.C.); R. v. Gomboc, 2010 SCC 55, 2010 CarswellAlta 2269, 2010 CarswellAlta 2270,
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echoes the notion that only that which is (modestly) secluded from the prying
eyes of a peeping Tom is protected.
The Ontario Court of Appeal case, R. v. Jarvis, involved a highschool teacher
who covertly photographed and filmed young women students in his high school
using a pen camera.38 The focus of the footage was on the women’s cleavage.
Jarvis was charged with voyeurism, an offence with three elements, including that
(i) the accused surreptitiously (non-consensually) observed or made a recording
of a complainant, (ii) in a context where the complainant has a reasonable
expectation of privacy, and that (iii) the observation was sexual in nature. The
majority of the court held that the Crown failed to prove the second element of
the offence. Students had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the parts of
their bodies that were visible to everyone.39 The majority contrasted this with the
hypothetical example of ‘‘upskirt photos” where an accused uses a camera
affixed to a shoe or other low vantage point to covertly take pictures under
women’s skirts.40 Women in these cases may expect privacy vis-à-vis the parts of
their bodies that are concealed, by virtue of this concealment. Rather than
premise the Jarvis complainants’ expectation of privacy around, for example, the
social circumstances in which the filming occurred, or the right of young women
not to be filmed by people in a position of power over them (regardless of
whether this is done openly or secretly), or the right of young women to control
information about themselves, the majority in Jarvis relied on concealment as
necessary to any expectation of privacy against sexual observation. Notably, as
of the time of writing, this decision is on appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada.
While explicit judicial reliance on modesty as the standard by which to assess
a woman’s privacy seems antiquted today (though hardly absent from judicial
reasoning41), this theory nevertheless laid some of the ground work for the
current understanding of the scope of privacy protection in Canadian and U.S.
doctine. Consequently, it failed to lay legal groundwork for protection against
common invasions of privacy experienced predominantly by women. In other
words, early privacy laws were not designed by or for women; the role of women
within the development of privacy jurisprucence has been as wives, daughters,

38

39
40
41

[2010] 3 S.C.R. 211, [2010] S.C.J. No. 55 (S.C.C.); R. v. Patrick, 2009 SCC 17, 2009
CarswellAlta 481, 2009 CarswellAlta 482, [2009] 1 S.C.R. 579, [2009] S.C.J. No. 17
(S.C.C.). But see R. v. Spencer, [2014] 2 S.C.R. 212, recognizing constitutional protection
of at least anonymity in some circumstances in public.
R. v. Jarvis, 2017 ONCA 778, 2017 CarswellOnt 15528, 139 O.R. (3d) 754, [2017] O.J.
No.5261, 356 C.C.C. (3d) 1 (Ont. C.A.) [Jarvis]. Appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada
heard on 20 April 2018. On appeal at the time of writing.
Ibid at para 108.
Ibid at para 98.
Reliance on notions of modesty as necessary to women’s protection from unwanted
advances still notably arises in sexual assault trials in Canada and the U.S. See, e.g., Allen
& Mack, supra note 19 at 444.
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and lovers of the (cis, heterosexual, property-owing, white) men whose interests
shaped the development of the doctrine.42
The lasting impact of the modesty theory of privacy may in fact reconcile the
different legal outcomes in a number of popular drone privacy stories. On the
one hand, aggressive measures taken to disarm a drone flying over private
property and purportedly exposing women to the gaze of a male stranger — to
the extreme of shooting down the drone over a residential area — have been
deemed socially, if not legally, acceptable (as already emphasized by Kaminski).
Meanwhile, no legal protection was offered to a woman who felt a similar sense
of intrusion on a public beach — her aggressive response to the drone operator
led to her being charged and ultimately convicted of criminal assault. 43 Similarly,
the privacy concerns of a sex-worker who was filmed with a john by a vigilante
with a drone were not raised in reports about the incident — even when the
vigilante posted his video online; meanwhile the sex worker was sentenced to a
year in prison on the basis of the drone footage.44
The next section of this article explores how the gaps in legal protections of
privacy outside the realm of seclusion and modesty (particularly in public space)
have an inequitable impact upon and amongst women, and how several features
of drones make the technology particularly adept at taking advantage of some of
these legal gaps.

SECTION II: DRONES AND GENDERED PRIVACY INVASIONS
One central implication of the modesty theory of privacy, rooted as it is in
women’s seclusion within the home, is that in public space, individuals enjoy
considerably less, or no, privacy. Feminist privacy scholarship has expounded
upon the implications of this for women — particularly with respect to
harassment on public streets, a form of privacy invasion that is overwhelmingly
targeted at women, yet under-regulated in law. This section first describes how
the features of the drone make the technology especially adept at engaging the
privacy of individuals in public space generally. It then draws from feminist
privacy literature, which builds on the discussion of the limits of the modesty
theory of privacy set out above, to demonstrate how women’s experiences of
privacy in public are underprotected in ways that drone technology is apt to
42
43

44

Allen & Mack, supra note 19.
‘‘Judge dismissed charges for man who shot down drone,” WDRB News (26 October
2015), online: <www.wdrb.com/story/30354128/judge-dismisses-charges-for-manwho-shot-down-drone>; Joel Landau, ‘‘Connecticut woman who assaulted teen for
drone at beach requests probation,” NY Daily News (19 June 2014), online:
<www.nydailynews.com/news/crime/conn-woman-attacked-teen-drone-seeks-probation-article-1.1836545>.
Samuel Osborne, ‘‘Prostitute caught on drone camera having sex with elderly man pleads
guilty,” Independent (31 March 2016), online: <www.independent.co.uk/news/world/
americas/prostitute-caught-on-drone-camera-having-sex-with-elderly-man-pleadsguilty-a6960946.html>.
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exploit. This discussion provides the basis for the final section of the article,
which argues that drone regulation requires broader consideration of the social
implications of the technology, including the ways in which it might differentially
impact individuals and groups.

Privacy-Invasive Drone Features
Drones have several features that combine to present fairly unique privacy
challenges, relative to other surveillance technologies. 45 For instance, two of the
most significant physical features of the drone that challenge privacy are also two
of its most fundamental features — the fact that drones fly, and that they do so
without a human on-board. The aerial nature of drone technology permits an
operator to access potentially unexpected vantage points of the ground below,
compared to ground-based or stationary tools of observation like CCTV
cameras or cell phone video. Further, as there is no human on board, the drone
can be smaller than a manned aircraft, and can be operated in areas that are too
dangerous or difficult for a manned craft to access. The unmanned aerial nature
of drones also makes the technology well suited for longer-term monitoring and
tracking, to the extent that fuel sources permit.46 Furthermore, since drones can
be purchased at relatively low costs (depending on the sophistication of the
device), and are easily accessible on the consumer market, they can be put to
wide-scale use by a variety of operators.47 These features and capabilities, among
others, can combine to create a ‘‘panoptic” chilling effect on individuals on the
ground below.48 The technology can not only collect enormous amounts of
45

46

47

48

The following two paragraphs are drawn from my prior work: see Kristen Thomasen,
‘‘Flying Between the Lines: Drone Laws and the (Re)Production of Public Spaces” in
Eric Hilgendorf & Uwe Seidel, eds, Robotics, Autonomics, and the Law (Baden-Baden,
Germany: Nomos, 2017) 205.
Battery power in many commercially accessible drones allows the device to stay aloft for
up to approximately 30 minutes. As battery technology progresses or other fuel sources
are developed this may, of course, change. However, for now, the more popular
commercially available drones would not be capable of long-term monitoring; some
more sophisticated drones may be able to stay aloft for longer. Meanwhile, corporations
hoping to use drones for delivery have recommended infrastructural changes in cities,
including battery re-charging stations, that would allow for longer flights: Adario
Strange, ‘‘Amazon patent shows how delivery drones could dock on street lights,”
Mashable (19 July 2016), online: <mashable.com/2016/07/19/amazon-drone-dockingstations/#bgnNomp9tOqH>.
Simple drones with built-in cameras can be purchased for $50 CAD. More sophisticated
drones cost in the thousands of dollars, which is still quite inexpensive relative to a
manned aircraft. The implications of this accessibility could mean considerably more
surveillance in public. See, e.g., Woodrow Hartzog & Evan Selinger, ‘‘Surveillance as
Loss of Obscurity” (2015) 72 Wash & Lee L Rev 1343.
Roger Clarke, ‘‘Understanding the Drone Epidemic” (2014) 30 Computer Law &
Security Review 230. As Professor Clarke explains, ‘‘drones actually bring back the sense
of physical superiority of the observation-point over ground-dwelling individuals.”
Professor Ryan Calo has previously described drones as representing ‘‘the cold,
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information from the ground below, it can also feel invasive and enter into one’s
personal space.49
It is of course possible that over time people will become accustomed to
drones in the sky, such that this panoptic effect eases. However, another legally
important feature of drones — the fact that they operate detached from a human
pilot — raises further challenges for privacy and accountability. An individual
may feel that a drone has invaded her privacy, but if she cannot identify its
operator because the pilot was located at a distance, then she may not know
whom to pursue, or through which legal mechanism, if any.50 Furthermore, an
individual might not know what information a drone is collecting or for what
purpose, which makes it difficult to know which legal remedy, if any, is available.
This uncertainty may also serve to compound the panoptic implications
discussed above. 51 The drone’s detachment from the pilot therefore
disempowers the observed; she has no immediate way to gain more
information about the drone’s operation or operator.52

Drones & Women’s Experience of Privacy in Public Space
In her book Uneasy Access, Professor Anita Allen demonstrated ways in
which women experience too much of the wrong kinds of privacy, and not
enough of the right kinds of privacy. Section I of this article touched on some of
the wrong kinds of women’s privacy — gender-biased standards of modesty that
stem, at least in part, from seclusion within the home and invisibility from
strangers. The wrong privacy has also included the ways in which privacy
doctrine has historically shielded domestic abusers from legal accountability, by

49

50

51

52

technological embodiment of observation.” See Ryan Calo, ‘‘The Drone as Privacy
Catalyst” 64 Stan L Rev Online 29 at 34.
As perhaps exemplified by the breadth of recent news stories involving individuals
shooting at drones, or otherwise seeking to disable them.
See, e.g., Froomkin & Colangelo, supra note 4. Of course recourse to the settler legal
system will not necessarily be a useful or preferred response to drone invasions. Drone
policy-planning must extend beyond these legal and regulatory responses.
Ibid. Uncertainty about a drone’s mission and owner played a significant role in an
encounter leading to one of the first U.S. criminal cases involving a drone (see, e.g., Justin
Peters, ‘‘Judge Dismisses Case Against Man Who Shot Down a Drone Over His
Property,” Slate, online: <www.slate.com/blogs/future_tense/2015/10/28/case_against_william_merideth_for_shooting_down_a_drone_is_dismissed.html>).
This could also result in individuals taking dangerous self-help measures in response to
drones. As Froomkin & Colangelo, supra note 4 explain at 33: ‘‘the less the victim knows
about the robot spy, or suspected spy, the more that its surveillance is likely to seem a
threat. And the more that the surveillance seems a threat, the more that the victim will
seek not just a judicial remedy — uncertain, likely time-consuming and costly, and
probably much too late to undo the harm — the more that the victim will seek a self-help
remedy.” See also: Ciara Bracken-Roche, ‘‘Domestic drones: The politics of verticality
and the surveillance industrial complex”, 71 Geographica Helvetica 167 (2016)
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protecting the ‘‘sanctity of the home” at the expense of women seeking state
assistance or protection from their (predominantly male) domestic abusers. 53
Meanwhile, women continue to lack what Allen refers to as the right kinds of
privacy — decisional autonomy, particularly over marriage, reproduction, and
sex (which were traditionally seen as part of ‘‘family life,” over which men had
decision-making authority), as well as the ability to seek replenishing solitude
outside the confines of the home. In other words, women in particular lack
privacy in public, due especially to the disruptions caused by sexual harassment
in public spaces and the workplace.
Allen defines ‘‘privacy in public” as the ‘‘inaccessibility of persons, their
mental states, and information about them to the senses and surveillance devices
of others.”54 She explains that ‘‘seclusion, achieved through physical distancing,
and anonymity, achieved through limited attention paid, are the forms of
inaccessibility that significantly constitute privacy in public.” 55 Through different
cases, the Supreme Court of Canada has similarly recognized that there can be
some expectation of privacy in public — either through an expectation that
encounters with others in public will be fleeting/limited in temporal scope, 56 will
be anonymous,57 and/or that observations, conversations, and personallyidentifying information collected in public will not be widely shared. 58
However, access to and the importance of this realm of privacy have been,
and continue to be, gendered. The public realm, as Allen describes, can be a place
53

54

55
56

57
58

See, e.g., Catherine MacKinnon, Feminism Unmodified: Discourses on Life and Law
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1987); Elizabeth M Schneider, ‘‘The Violence of
Privacy” (1990—1991) 23 Conn L Rev 973.
Allen, supra note 18 at 123-124. The question of what ‘‘privacy in public” entails is not an
easy or straightforward one to answer, and requires consideration of different theories of
privacy, as well as what constitutes public. I turn to Allen’s definition here as a helpful
one for thinking through, in particular, the gendered nature of privacy’s early and ongoing development. However, this is by no means an exclusive definition. For more on
this issue see especially Woodrow Hartzog, ‘‘The Public Information Fallacy” 98 BUL
Rev [forthcoming in 2018]; Stuart Hargreaves, ‘Relational Privacy’ & Tort” (2017) 23
Wm & Mary J Women & L 433; Kristen Thomasen, ‘‘Robots in the Public Square:
Regulation and the Changing Nature of Public Space” (We Robot 2018, Stanford
University, 14 April 2018), online: <conferences.law.stanford.edu/werobot/wp-content/uploads/sites/47/2018/02/Thomasen-Robots-in-the-Public-Square-We-RobotDraft.pdf>.
Allen, supra note 18 at 123-124.
R. v. Wise, 1992 CarswellOnt 71, 1992 CarswellOnt 982, [1992] 1 S.C.R. 527, [1992] S.C.J.
No. 16 (S.C.C.).
R. v. Spencer, supra note 37.
Aubry c. Éditions Vice-Versa Inc., 1998 CarswellQue 4806, 1998 CarswellQue 4807,
[1998] 1 S.C.R. 591, [1998] S.C.J. No. 30, 157 D.L.R. (4th) 577 (S.C.C.); R. v. Marakah,
2017 S.C.C. 59, 2017 CarswellOnt 19341, 2017 CarswellOnt 19342, [2017] 2 S.C.R. 608,
[2017] S.C.J. No. 59 (S.C.C.); restraints on collection of information — including in
public — for commercial purposes are also set out in Personal Information Protection and
Electronic Documents Act, S.C. 2000, c. 5. [PIPEDA].
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of private tasks, where women can alleviate or escape the stresses of home or
employment. However, intrusions into one’s solitude or ‘‘right to be let alone” —
e.g. by street harassment — can ‘‘break the flow of thought and distract a
woman’s attention, utterly without purpose, from her own concerns.”59 Private
tasks and repose are replaced with experiences of leering, insulting, prying, and
offensive touching.60 These unwanted intrusions have the effect of silencing,
intimidating, and objectifying women when they enter public space, 61 and often
leave women with little legal or normative recourse, either out of fear of a
dangerous altercation, the desire to avoid embarrassment, or a lack of time,
money, or unlikelihood of success in seeking police or legal intervention. 62
Viewed individually, these privacy invasions can seem de minimis, and perhaps
receive little or no legal protection for this reason.63 But when their frequency is
considered, the impact of these invasions on women’s access to privacy is
cumulatively significant.64
For example, Canadian and U.S. statistics show that women’s experience of
street harassment is widespread — near universal by some estimates. 65
Additionally, public harassment is experienced significantly differently
amongst women. For example, in the United States, African American women
59
60

61
62
63

64

65

Allen, supra note 18 at 128.
Ibid. This does not include such encounters as striking up a conversation or flirtation:
‘‘The privacy-diminishing intrusions that are to be condemned as morally disrespectful
and harmful have little to do with genuine personal interest in the women who are
victimized.” Ibid at 133. Precisely the kind of encounter that could not (likely) be
mediated by an anonymizing technology.
Ibid at 131.
Ibid at 127.
Ibid. See also Cynthia Grant Bowman, ‘‘Street Harassment and the Informal
Ghettoization of Women” (1993) 106 Harv L Rev 517.
Allen, supra note 18. See also Jena McGill & Ian Kerr, ‘‘Reduction to Absurdity:
Reasonable Expectations of Privacy and the Need for Digital Enlightenment” in Jacques
Bus et al, eds, Digital Enlightenment Yearbook (Amsterdam: IOS Press, 2012) on the
problem of reviewing a series of relatively minor privacy invasions independently, rather
than as a whole.
A study by Cornell University found that 85% of women in the United States experience
street harassment before the age of 17. The study also indicated that 50% of women
under 40 had been groped or fondled in the last year, whereas 77% of women had been
followed by a man or a group of men. Over half of the respondents noted changing their
clothing or behaviour due to concerns over street harassment. See ILR School Cornell
University, ‘‘Street Harassment Statistics,” online: <www.ilr.cornell.edu/news/streetharassment-statistics>; Beth A Livingston, ‘‘Street Harassment Statistics in the United
States,” online: Cornell Survey Project <www.slideshare.net/iHollaback/street-harassment-statistics-in-canada-cornell-survey-project-2015-48200467>; See also ‘‘Statistics
— Stop Street Harassment Studies,” online: Stop Street Harassment <www.stopstreetharassment.org/resources/statistics/sshstudies/>. Similarly, 88% of Canadian women
report their first instance of street harassment before the age of 17. See Beth A
Livingston, ‘‘Street Harassment Statistics in the United States,” online: Cornell Survey
Project <www.slideshare.net/ iHollaback/cornell-canada>.
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not only experience quantitatively more street harassment, but the harassment is
qualitatively different, rooted in histories of slavery and sexism. 66 Furthermore,
verbal or physical harassment can escalate into more intrusive, dangerous, or
violent forms of public harassment, including stalking and rape, which are also
experienced differently at intersecting axes of marginalization.67 Women can also
face non-consensual filming and photography of their bodies and activities,
sometimes accompanied by the sharing of these images online, which not only
interrupts their enjoyment of public space, but also disempower them by
undermining their control over information about themselves.68 By interfering
with a woman’s safety, security, repose, solitude, and even her anonymity and
control over images of herself, street harassment, stalking, and other sexual
violence in public constitute (at least) invasions of a woman’s privacy in public
space, against which she might have limited normative or legal recourse because
of the very space where the intrusion occurs.
66

67

68

See, e.g., Deirdre Davis, ‘‘The Harm that has No Name: Street Harassment,
Embodiment and African American Women” (1994) 4 UCLA Women’s LJ 133;
Deborah M Thompson, ‘‘‘The Woman in the Street‘:Reclaiming the Public Space from
Sexual Harassment” (1993) 2 Yale JL & Feminism 313.
Kimberlé Crenshaw, “Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black
Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist
Politics” (1989) University of Chicago Legal Forum 139. In regard to escalating violence
in public, see, for example, the case of Marie Laguerre in France, in which street
harassment turned violent, with the whole encounter between Ms. Laguerre and the
harasser captured on CCTV video. The video was subsequently posted online. The
public reaction prompted the French government to outlaw street harassment. This case
is an example of street harassment turning violent, but also contributes to a problematic
notion that video surveillance might be used to protect women, discussed further below.
Kim Wilsher, ‘‘Uproar in France over video of woman hit by harasser in Paris street,” (30
July 2018) The Guardian, online: <www.theguardian.com/world/2018/jul/30/uproarin-france-over-video-of-woman-marie-laguerre-hit-by-harasser-in-paris-street>.
Stalking is the fifth most common violent offence committed against women in Canada.
Canadian women are three times more likely to be victims of stalking than men,
perpetrators are most often men: see Ministry of the Status of Women, ‘‘Statistics: Sexual
Harassment and Stalking,” online: <http://www.women.gov.on.ca/owd/english/ending-violence/sexual_harassment.shtml>; however, Indigenous people in Canada are
twice as likely (7%) as non-Indigenous people (3%) to have experienced some form of
stalking, and young women aged 15-24 reported the highest rates of being stalked: see
Department of Justice Canada, A Handbook for Police and Crown Prosecutors on
Criminal Harassment, November 2012 update (Ottawa: Department of Justice Canada,
2009); Metropolitian Action Committee on Violence Against Women and Children,
What You Need to Know About Salking: A Guide for Service Providers, March 2009
update (Toronto: METRAC, 2003). Similarly, in the United States women of colour
experience higher rates of stalking — 1 in 4 American Indigenous women report
experiencing stalking, and 1 in 5 African-American women experience stalking: see
Colorado State University, ‘‘Stalking Statistics,” online: <http://www.wgac.colostate.edu/stalking-statistics>.
See, e.g., ‘‘Upskirt Photos Not Illegal, U.S. Court Rules,” CBC News (6 March 2014),
online: <www.cbc.ca/news/world/upskirt-photos-not-illegal-u-s-court-rules1.2562395>. See also, Jarvis, supra note 38.
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These existing conditions of inequality will impact and be impacted by the
development and adoption of new technologies like the drone. 69 Drone
technology certainly does not cause street harassment or stalking, nor is it a
necessary condition for the invasions of women’s privacy described above. But
the technology is integrating into a social context in which street harassment and
stalking are already a moral and social — if not legal — problem for women. So,
it is necessary to consider how the technology might impact that social context —
and how that social context might (or should) impact the development and
regulation of the technology.
On one hand, the combination of several key attributes of drone technology
— in particular its dislocation from the operator and related anonymity of the
user of the device, as well as the ‘‘silent observer” nature of the technology —
might actually discourage its use for some forms of street harassment, which
often entail a more personal interaction between the harasser and the individual
experiencing harassment, and the assertion of a power dynamic between them. 70
These features though, also make the drone more apt for use in escalated forms
of harassment like stalking where the stalker can remain anonymous and
potentially more difficult to identify — not to mention more capable of accessing
unexpected or difficult to shield vantage points. Drones have, in fact, already
been used for these purposes for exactly these reasons.71 Additionally, the
dislocation of the drone from its operator deepens the power imbalance between
the harasser and the individual whose privacy is invaded. Where there is already
little legal or social recourse for a privacy invasion by a person, the drone adds a
further informational and accountability barrier — an individual encountering a
drone might not know who is operating the drone, why, or how to prevent it.
Furthermore, the nature of the drone as an anonymous observer could have
an acutely objectifying impact — there is no social interaction intended, the
object of the observation is entirely objectified.72 In this case, rather than
reducing its potential for harassment, the drone’s unique combination of features
might simply change the nature and experience of harassment. Perhaps then, it is
69

70
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Torin Monahan, ‘‘Dreams of Control at a Distance: Gender, Surveillance, and Social
Control” (2009) 9 Cultural Studies Critical Methodologies 286 at 289.
See, e.g., Thompson, supra note 66 at 327-328. This of course assumes that the drone is
not equipped with one or two-way communication. There is no good reason to assume
this limitation in the future.
Diana Tourjee, ‘‘Several Women in This Rural Town Say They Were Stalked by
Drones,” Broadly Vice (2 November 2017), online: <broadly.vice.com/en_us/article/
9kqqjp/several-women-in-this-rural-town-say-they-were-stalked-by-drones?utm_source=broadlytwitterus>.
See, e.g., Laura Mulvey, ‘‘Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema” (1975) 16 Oxford
Journals 6 (setting out the concept of male gaze); Hille Koskela, ‘‘‘The Gaze without
Eyes’: Video-Surveillance and the Changing Nature of Urban Space” (2000) 24 Progress
in Human Geography 243; Donna Haraway, ‘‘Situated Knowledges: The Science
Question in Feminism and the Privilege of Partial Perspective (1988) 14 Feminist Studies
575.
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unsurprising that stories are already proliferating about drones being used to
sexually harass, stalk, and objectify women in public.73 Concern about public
harassment of women and the impact of harassment on their privacy can be
distinguished from the ‘‘sunbather narrative” that focuses on women’s modesty,
as here the focus is on the invasion into a woman’s personal privacy in the form
of her right to repose, to use and enjoy public space, and to anonymity — rights
that are also central to men’s privacy in public space, and not to a woman’s duty
of modesty.
Further consideration, and empirical and qualitative work, is needed to
better understand and unpack how this emerging and potentially prolific
technology will impact privacy in public. None of the above discussion is
intended to suggest that drones may not be used the same way against men.
However, the social context, including the long history of sexual violence,
stalking, and objectification of women in public, cannot be overlooked. While
drone technology — and the surveillance payloads that can be attached to it —
will engage the privacy interests of both men and women in public spaces, 74
gender — intersecting with race, colonialism, sexuality, class, disability, and age
— continues to be an important determinant of one’s ability to expect and assert
personal privacy outside the home.75

Privacy Consequences of Drones as a Tool to ‘‘Protect” Women in Public
Space
A further privacy issue that should be considered in the context of drone
privacy regulation may soon emerge in light of the reality of women’s experiences
in public spaces cited above. Drones have recently been suggested as a tool to
help protect women, in particular from gender-based violence in public. Two
recent examples include the use of drones as personal streetlamps, which can be
summoned through a cell phone application and which would follow an
individual around when they feel unsafe.76 A second recent suggestion has been
to use drones to monitor public spaces perceived as high risk for crime — in
73
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Callie Beusman, ‘‘Of Course Women Are Getting Sexually Harassed by Drones,”
Jezebel (14 May 2014), online: < jezebel.com/of-course-women-are-getting-sexuallyharassed-by-drones-1576526357>; Lauren O’Neil, ‘‘Sexual Harassment by Drones a
Growing Concern” CBC News (11 June 2014), online: <www.cbc.ca/newsblogs /your
community/2014/06/sexual-harassment-by-drones-a-growing-concern.html>; Maggie
Gilis, ‘‘‘Creepy and Invasive’: St. John’s Woman Says She’s Being Watched by a Drone,”
CBC News (30 November 2016), online: <www.cbc.ca/ news/canada/newfoundlandlabrador/drone-following-st-john-s-woman-1.3874380>.
However, these types of informational invasions, and their consequences, are also
heavily based on gender, race, class, age, disability, and so on. See, e.g., Monahan, supra
note 69; Simone Browne, Dark Matters: On the Surveillance of Blackness (Durham, NC:
Duke University Press, 2015); Rachel E Dubrofsky & Shoshana Amielle Magnet, eds,
Feminist Surveillance Studies (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2015).
Anita Allen, ‘‘Gender and Privacy in Cyberspace” (2000) 52 Stan L Rev 1175.
Peter Corboy, ‘‘Fleetlights: A Prototype Team of Flying Torch Drones to Guide the Way
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particular, the New Delhi, India police force plans to use small surveillance
drones equipped with night vision and thermal imaging cameras as a means to
counteract rape.77 These proposed uses, among other similar proposals by both
state and private actors, could very well have beneficial outcomes for women.
But such proposals must be subjected to a critical analysis before their
acceptance and widespread adoption, particularly where the justification for
this drone usage is the purported ‘‘protection of women.”
As professors Mason and Magnet observe,
. . . it is a difficult task to critique surveillance technologies aimed at
ensuring women’s safety against abusers. When made visible as antiviolence tools, technologies of surveillance appear to be uncontroversial
to a range of actors. [. . . but] by overlooking the complex ways that
surveillance practices and technologies are entrenched within the prison
industrial complex, one might miss key challenges that surveillance
technologies pose to anti-violence strategies. Whether it is smartphones,
iPhone applications, Google maps, or home surveillance, feminist
surveillance studies scholars must investigate the ways that existing
inequalities may be exacerbated by their use.78

Drone privacy scholarship must be attentive to the ways in which the
protection of one marginalized group could be co-opted to justify, for example,
increasing public surveillance, or surveillance of particular people or places. 79
For instance, the social construction of the ‘‘woman as a victim” in need of
protection can lead to her own forced surveillance. Professors Wesley and
Gaardener highlight the difficult trade-off women can experience between
wanting to feel safe while accessing the outdoors, and their discomfort with the
increased surveillance that can accompany this desire.80 The potential of a selfsummoned drone lamp that tracks one’s location will perhaps encompass this
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at Night,” Designboom (18 November 2016), online: <www.designboom.com/technology/fleetlights-direct-line-drone-app-11-18-2016/>.
Anne Stelle, ‘‘Will Drones Keep India’s Women Safe From Rape?,” Global News Blog
(11 December 2014), online: <www.csmonitor.com/World/Global-News/2014/1211/
Will-drones-keep-India-s-women-safe-from-rape>; Zusha Elinson, ‘‘Taser Explores
Concept of Drone Armed With Stun Gun for Police Use,” The Wall Street Journal (20
October 2016), online: <www.wsj.com/articles/taser-explores-concept-of-dronearmed-with-stun-gun-for-policeuse-1476994514>.
Mason & Magnet, supra note 1 at 114-116: ‘‘assertions that surveillance technologies
keep us safer from violence as they help police to arrest perpetrators [are] deeply
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through mandatory arrest policies for women, or women may avoid even those
technologies explicitly designed to help enable police surveillance of their abusers for fear
of a criminal justice outcome.”
Dubrofsky & Magnet, supra note 74 at 1. The ‘‘racist imagining of violence as key to
communities of colour justifies new forms of surveillance by the state in ways that
facilitate the disproportionate criminalization of communities of colour.” Dubrofsky &
Magnet, supra note 74 at 8.
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difficult balancing in the future. It must be acknowledged, however, that as the
technology becomes more prolific and accessible, women may lose any real
choice in the matter. For instance, were a woman to avoid some purportedly
helpful or protective surveillance and then experience violence in public, law
enforcement, courts, or social circles might question why she resisted the helpful
technology — a form of tech-driven victim blaming.
Further, North American history is replete with examples where the fear of
victimization of white women has justified racial discrimination, criminalization,
and surveillance of marginalized groups, including other women. 81
Compounding this justification for discrimination, such narratives can serve to
further justify a state refusal to surveil or criminalize those who abuse members
of these marginalized groups,82 such as the Canadian government’s refusal to
investigate the murders of Indigenous women and girls,83 while simultaneously
supporting state surveillance of Indigenous communities and individuals. 84
While, again, drone technology is not the cause of, nor does it necessitate,
this outcome, the technology is well-suited to facilitate and expand state
surveillance, particularly when coupled with the seemingly beneficial promise of
improving women’s security. This is supported by, among other things, the
drone’s relatively low cost (both to acquire, and to operate relative to police foot
or helicopter patrol), capacity to enter into otherwise difficult-to-access areas,
and the increasing autonomy of the device permitted by on-board software that
requires less skill and training to operate.85 In other words, the drone overcomes
many of the resource barriers that would ordinarily limit such surveillance. 86
Accordingly, assessing the increased state use of drones through a feminist lens
requires consideration of the ways in which drones — potentially those utilized
with the goal of protecting women — may actually increase the surveillance of
(particularly, marginalized) women in public.87
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Furthermore, deeper consideration of whether this use of drone technology
will actually have the effect of protecting the women it purports to protect is
necessary. Professor Koskela’s analysis of the effectiveness of CCTV cameras
used for this same purpose reveals a number of concerns, including that these
volume-less cameras failed to protect women from verbal assaults, and that the
cameras transformed into a form of voyeurism for the predominantly male
security personnel.88 One could imagine, with the drone’s dislocation from a
human intervener, that human intervention in a crime would have, at least, a
time-delay and as noted above, an objectifying impact on the individual being
observed.89
Finally, the assumption that video or other evidence collected by a drone
would assist a complainant in the event of violence in public must be critically
assessed. For example, digital evidence in criminal prosecutions of sexual
violence has not consistently been treated by courts as beneficial to the
complainant or prosecution. In her examination of several recent Canadian
cases, Alexa Dodge explains how even digital evidence that seems to confirm a
complainant’s testimony (or substitutes for it where she cannot remember) could
be used against her in ways bolstered by rape myths.90 Dodge gives as one
example the case R. v. R. (J.), where an accused was seen on a surveillance
camera grabbing the complainant’s breasts and buttock. The judge at first
instance concluded that the complainant was unclear or ambiguous in the video
about whether she was consenting to the touching — the video was subsequently
interpreted as contradicting her verbal testimony.91 Though this decision was
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underlying theory of privacy guiding the assessment. Privacy harms can arguably flow
from unknown observation, or from situations where the observation is entirely
automated — i.e. where footage is analyzed only by technical means, not through human
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Boundaries of Privacy Harm” (2011) 86 Ind LJ 1131 at 1159-1161.
Alexa Dodge, ‘‘The digital witness: The role of digital evidence in criminal justice
responses to sexual violence” (2017) Feminist Theory 1.

328 CANADIAN JOURNAL OF LAW AND TECHNOLOGY

[16 C.J.L.T.]

later overturned, it nevertheless underscores Dodge’s observation that while
digital evidence may be assumed to be ‘‘static and lacking human bias,”92 and
therefore useful in the prosecution of crime, its use is never truly objective,
particularly when it is interpreted by another individual in different
circumstances.93 This is not to mention the fact that criminal prosecution —
particularly one which involves the display of video evidence of the crime —
might not be the preferred or desired recourse for a complainant. Yet the
existence of such video evidence may, ultimately, take the decision about
recourse away from her. The justification of increasing public surveillance to
protect women should therefore be subjected to further critical analysis on the
basis that the purported evidence obtained from drones might not even serve the
purpose of protecting women, particularly if scrutinized with attention to the
impact of pervasive cultural rape myths.
The examples of the gendered implications of this emerging technology
discussed in this section are non-exhaustive and each will merit deeper analysis if/
as drone technology is more widely adopted. A further observation that can be
drawn from the above discussion is that the experience and personal
consequences of privacy invasions and surveillance in public space have been
known to members of subordinated groups, including women, for a long time. 94
While the drone has been seen as a ‘‘privacy catalyst”95 — a tool with the
potential to draw greater social attention to the value and precarity of privacy
protections — the real impact that it may have will be to catalyze the attention
and concern of members of empowered groups, who by virtue of a privileged
status have not been subject to significant privacy invasions and surveillance. 96
Critically though, any meaningful response prompted by an increased
recognition of the importance of privacy must be comprehensive enough to
acknowledge different experiences of privacy and its invasion by drones.
Drawing on this examination, the final section of this article considers whether
and how these different implications can be addressed through the current North
American approach to drone regulation.
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SECTION III: REFLECTING ON THE ‘‘SAFETY-FIRST” FOCUS OF
CANADIAN AND U.S. DRONE REGULATION
Having considered some ways in which drone technology might differentially
affect women’s privacy, particularly in ways that might not be addressed under
privacy laws of general application, this section examines Canadian and U.S.
drone-specific regulation to assess whether and how some of these differential
outcomes might be addressed within existing regulatory frameworks.97
First, this section identifies a North American ‘‘approach” to drone
regulation — namely, identifying the general themes and priorities in the
regulation of drones, and how regulations purport to apply to the technology
itself and the social contexts into which it is adopted. The goal here is not to set
out a detailed summary of all drone laws in Canada and the United States, many
of which are in a state of frequent flux, but rather to draw out some
generalizations, as these are helpful for the subsequent analysis of drone
regulation, particularly in light of issues raised in the preceding section. This
section then goes on to explain why the current value-neutral approach to drone
regulation can not sufficiently address the ways in which this technology can
negatively impact individuals and communities, beyond their personal physical
safety. Finally the section argues that social impacts of the technology need to be
better addressed not only in technology-neutral privacy laws, but also through
the rules that regulate drone design and permissible uses.

Canadian and U.S. Approach to Drone Regulation
In regards to Canadian and U.S. drone regulation, a preliminary observation
is that both countries now appear to accept that drone technology is ‘‘here to
stay”. While in each country there are some significant regulatory limits on
widespread drone use, the federal governments of both Canada and the U.S.
have taken the position that drone technology will bring economic benefits to
society as a whole, and that it is worth encouraging further adoption. 98 This is
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significant in the sense that, while regulators might strive to address and
minimize risks associated with the technology, ultimately there is an expectation
that non-risky uses of the technology will increasingly be permitted.
Another important aspect of drone regulation in the context of riskassessment is a focus on safety. In both Canada and the U.S., the primary
regulators of drone technology are federal safety agencies — Transport Canada
and the Federal Aviation Administration, respectively. The specific rules
promulgated by these agencies unsurprisingly focus on safety, particularly with
respect to other airspace users, as well as people, animals, and property on the
ground.99
In both countries, drone regulations vary according to the operator of the
drone (state agencies, commercial operators, recreational users, journalists) —
though these distinctions are beginning to disappear100 — and according to the
size of the drone (smaller drones are subject to less regulation than larger
drones). In both countries, recreational users (those who fly drones for personal
reasons, not for commercial or research purposes) were largely unregulated for a
long time, though this is also beginning to change.101 Commercial drone
operators (who put their drone toward a business purpose) have traditionally
been highly regulated. The extent of regulation has not been predicated on the
purpose of the operation (beyond the commercial versus recreational
distinction), nor on the types of surveillance or other payloads attached to the
drone.
For safety reasons, flights over populated areas, and flights near airports are
generally more restricted than those over open fields or unpopulated spaces.
Both countries restrict drones from certain airspace, including near military
installations, prisons, and in national parks. While these safety rules have some
beneficial consequences for personal privacy — particularly by limiting the use of
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drones in populated areas — privacy is not the central philosophy of drone
regulation. Accordingly, as the safety of drone technology improves, some of
these laws that currently protect privacy only consequentially will likely
change.102
In Canada, privacy concerns raised by drones have received relatively little
attention from drone regulators, beyond general calls for drone operators to
‘‘respect the privacy of others” and ‘‘avoid flying over private property or taking
photos or videos without permission.”103 By contrast, the privacy implications of
drones have received more attention in the U.S.104 For example, the National
Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA) has developed
voluntary drone privacy guidelines, to which the FAA refers operators. These
guidelines primarily recommend notifying individuals whose data might be
collected, and collecting the minimum amount of information necessary. 105 In a
press release corresponding with the implementation of new drone rules in June
2016, the FAA advised that it will act to address privacy considerations and
provide drone users with ‘‘recommended privacy guidelines” as a part of a
registration process.106 Privacy practices are couched as a way to ensure the
economic success and social integration of the technology, for commercial and
102
103
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non-commercial operators.107 While these are positive privacy ideals, to date
they provide no actual legal recourse for individuals negatively affected by drone
use. Indeed, accountability and recourse for privacy concerns have not been the
primary focus for either of the national regulators.108
In the United States, and to a lesser degree in Canada, other levels of
government have also begun to regulate drones in relation to privacy. Often these
laws do not address the existing gaps in legal protection in public space that leave
many forms of gendered privacy invasions un- or under-protected against. 109
Some state laws permit self-defensive action against drones over private
property, though not in public space.110 Nevertheless, the validity of many of
these laws can be challenged given the primacy of federal jurisdiction in both
countries.111

Implications of the Safety-Based Approach to Drone Regulation
Having set out some general themes in the approach to drone regulation, this
sub-section analyzes this regulatory approach. None of the drone laws in Canada
or the U.S. are explicitly gendered — there are no laws restricting or mandating
particular gender-driven access to or use of drone technology. However, as
Langdon Winner has famously observed, artefacts, like the drone, have
politics112 — and regulatory frameworks that fail to consider these politics
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may permit the perpetuation of inequalities through those technologies.113 Even
though the laws regulating drones appear to be gender neutral, these regulations
can, in fact, obscure the gendered impacts of the technology.
For instance, the primary regulatory focus on safety presumes that this
technology presents the same types of risks (physical injury and property
damage), of the same level of importance, to everyone. This approach fails to
take into account the other politics of the device — such as lending an operator a
degree of anonymity, or perpetuating an informational and power imbalance
between the operator and the object of observation (who might not be able to
locate, or stop, the operator), or enhancing the feeling of objectification
experienced by individual observed by a drone — which can have different
meanings for different people. It is feasible that for some, physical safety from a
drone is not the first priority or concern for regulation. For instance, prevention
of drone harassment, intimidation, or voyeurism permitted by the technology —
and the subsequent publication of information emanating from such encounters
— might be a higher or equivalent priority to some, at least at the point of
encountering the device. Prevention of state sanctioned pervasive surveillance in
public spaces (including those that would be hard to access on foot, or expensive
to access by manned aircraft) might be the predominant concern for others.
Furthermore, the regulatory approach does not explicitly distinguish
between different social contexts in which drones might be operated. While
regulations can apply differently in populated versus unpopulated areas (which
has the consequence of treating different social contexts differently) these
regulations are not designed with social context in mind and do not recognize
any differences between the social contexts arising in populated and lesspopulated areas. As noted, they are also subject to change as the technology
becomes safer. Additionally, drone regulations do not consider the impact of
different payloads or different drone design features in different contexts or on
different individuals.114 Regulations instead focus on regulating the artefact (the
‘drone’ as an unmanned vehicle that takes to the airspace), rather than how it
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integrates into society. Accordingly, the particular politics embodied in the
technology remain largely unaddressed.
Of course, as discussed above, the FAA and other levels of government,
particularly in the United States, have begun to turn their attention toward
privacy. This is a positive step in terms of addressing some of the social concerns
that drones raise. However, to date this has generated little actual legal or
normative protection or recourse, particularly for the kinds of privacy invasions
that disproportionately affect women. And Canada has remained behind in
addressing privacy issues through drone regulation generally. The next section
sets out some initial steps for moving forward.

Preliminary Responses to these Regulatory Challenges
Recognizing that the primary responsibility for drone regulation in both
Canada and the United States falls to safety agencies, this section sets out some
possible next steps toward addressing some of the differential impacts of drones
within the current framework. However, without a broader rethinking of both
privacy law (particularly as it applies in public space),115 and the system for
drone regulation, these recommendations are limited in their scope and impact.
The ultimate solution to the issues identified in this article will be the dismantling
of the systems of oppression that lead to these differential privacy experiences,
among other inequities and injustices.116 This section simply sets out some
preliminary ideas for how regulators might start to re-balance the attributes of
drone technology, through regulation, so as to address a broader range of
concerns beyond airspace safety.
First, federal drone regulators ought to accept responsibility to consider the
privacy and other social impacts of drone technology and to address these
impacts through policy and regulation. As noted, the FAA has already begun to
address some privacy concerns related to drone use. A broad understanding of
airspace ‘‘safety” will increasingly need to include privacy. As this author has
previously argued along with drone scholar Ciara Bracken-Roche:
Addressing privacy in [drone] regulations is not only forward-thinking
but it helps to mitigate potential conflicts that may arise from public
concern about [drone] data collection, and can contribute to a greater
sense of security amongst the public encountering [drone] technology.
As [drone] technologies almost always collect data, operators also need
to be aware of the privacy concerns that not only arise in the real-time
115
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operation of [drones] but also the longer term questions about data
collection, protection, and storage.117

Addressing privacy concerns can arguably enhance airspace safety by, for
instance, mitigating potential conflicts prompted by the use of the technology,
like the examples discussed in Part I above. By addressing the privacy and other
social impacts of the technology through regulation, regulators also have an
opportunity to encourage privacy-friendly technological design. 118 Drone
manufacturers have already implemented safety-enhancing designs into their
products, including limiting the user’s ability to fly the technology in specific
airspace.119 Similarly, imposing certain data collection limits on the permissible
use of the technology, for instance, can encourage designs that allow users to
follow such requirements. Treating privacy concerns as outside the scope of
‘‘safety” overlooks an opportunity to influence the trajectory of innovation in
more a publically beneficial and context-aware direction, and to ultimately
enhance the safety of both airspace and of the individuals who encounter and
interact with airspace technologies.
Second, regulators must place greater emphasis on developing mechanisms
for accountability. Regulators can continue to develop design requirements that
help to rebalance the informational and power imbalance between the operator
of the drone and the individual encountering the drone, which could
subsequently provide an avenue for redress and future prevention. This may
be a difficult task, technologically. For example, while drones could be required
to bear the equivalent of a licence plate, which can aid with identifying the
operator, how can regulators ensure that it is visible from a distance or while the
drone is in movement? Emitting information from the drone to, for instance, a
cell phone application could be useful, but presumes that individuals
experiencing negative encounters also own and carry a phone. Similarly, listing
all drone flights on a website would be useful, except to those without regular
access to the Internet. Providing a mechanism or reporting outlet for harmful
drone encounters, or even a dedicated investigator or mediator, could also
further this endeavour, though such initiatives can be resource-heavy, or
potentially ineffective. However, accountability need not and ought not always
117
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involve state actors and the judicial system. Professor Michael Froomkin and
Zak Colangelo have suggested design-based mechanisms to address the
information imbalance between the drone operator and an individual
encountering a drone, as a means for reducing uncertainty about the device.
For instance, a drone could be equipped with coloured lights or other markers to
inform individuals about the drone’s capabilities (e.g., whether or not it is
filming).120 This may also help to address the power imbalance between the
operator and the observed by giving the observed greater awareness relating to
the encounter — though this still must be accompanied by some form of recourse
to address privacy harm. None of these suggestions definitively deal with the
issue of gendered privacy invasions. However these combined factors could begin
to address some of the attributes of drones that risk worsening the state of public
privacy for women.
Regulators should simultaneously focus on increasing public participation in
all stages of the regulatory process — developing mechanisms for intervention at
both the design phase and in the contexts of sale and use.121 One mechanism is to
adopt a ‘‘critical feminist technology assessment,” extending existing technology
assessment procedures by, ‘‘first, giving voice to the full range of interested
groups in technological design and, second, starting from a critical debate about
what and whose needs are to be met, rather than from existing technologies.”122
In other words, focus on democratizing the technology from the ‘‘outside in.” 123
As a final observation, regulators can adopt policies and targets to enable
women to increase their technical competence and access to drone technology. 124
There are already numerous endeavours targeted at increasing women’s
involvement in the industry, as well a number of women in prominent
positions within the drone industry.125 Nevertheless, men still heavily dominate
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Ibid at 91.
Ibid. Of course, recommendations arising from such an assessment may call for
significant changes to current drone design or permissible drone use, or even an undoing
of currently permissible design or use, which might encounter resistance from users and
manufacturers who rely on the current state of regulation. However, the status quo
should not serve as an impediment to improved regulation. Drone design and use already
encounter resistance from other affected community members, as discussed throughout
Part I. While the technology is already in widespread use in both Canada and the U.S.,
the state of regulations, and even design, remain in flux. Broader assessments of the
impact of the technology, beyond a focus on physical safety, can still influence the
trajectory of law and innovation, as well as the emerging norms around drone use, and
ought to be considered.
Ibid.
Matt McCue, ‘‘Meet the Women Shaping the Future of the Drone Business,” Fortune (1
July 2015), online: <fortune.com/2015/07/01/women-drone-industry/>; Sally French,
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the drone industry.126 Greater diversity of voices both within and without the
industry can help to democratise the technology from both the inside and out.
However, encouraging women into the industry cannot be the sole or primary
solution to addressing the issues raised in this article. First, it places an
expectation on women to accept the system as is and learn to adapt to and within
it — a system that some women may deem socially harmful. 127 Simply
encouraging women to become more involved with technology that is largely
shaped by and for men will not necessarily bring about more egalitarian or
feminist technology. Second, while becoming increasingly affordable, drone
technology is still a luxury to many, who may not have the financial or time
resources to dedicate to entering into an industry, particularly out of a ‘‘gender
obligation”. Encouraging more women to become involved with the technology
from a technical or policy perspective can have positive consequences, but cannot
be the sole solution to addressing differential impacts of the technology.
Ultimately, broader changes to law and society will be needed to fulsomely
address many of the underlying issues identified in this article. Nevertheless,
drone regulators are in a position to have an immediate and direct impact on the
use and design of a technology that — because of its particular features — could
exacerbate existing social inequities. These public agencies ought to take this
broader social context into consideration when regulating drone technology.

CONCLUSION
This article has drawn from feminist privacy scholarship in order to consider
some of the gendered ways in which drone technology might engage privacy law
and norms. The non-exhaustive list of examples has revealed that the traditional
norms of women’s privacy as rooted in modesty persist today, if not explicitly in
the legal framework, certainly in popular discussions of drone technology. This
narrative risks undermining the ability of women to assert privacy in public
spaces, particularly in response to persistent gendered invasions of their privacy,
which can be exacerbated by the attributes of drone technology. Yet a purported
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concern about women’s safety in public could simultaneously lead to greater
surveillance by drone technology — both of and amongst women — further
engaging and worsening experiences of privacy in public space. When assessing
the Canadian and U.S. approach to drone regulation, in light of these concerns,
it becomes apparent that the current approach treats the technology as valueneutral, rather than as a system embedded with particular politics. Regulatory
agencies should place greater emphasis on addressing some of the politics of the
drone — for instance, by working to eliminate the power imbalance caused by
the drone’s dislocation from its operator (among other possible responses), by
bringing more voices into policy and regulatory discussions at the development,
sale, and use phases, while also increasing women’s involvement in the industry
and in the use of the technology. Ultimately, though, the most rewarding
solution to many of these concerns will only come from broader social and legal
change.

